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Foreword
There is an undeniable shift happening in international drug policy. Lawmakers—some-
times at the urging of voters—are debating regulatory approaches in a number of jurisdic-
tions. Internationally, leaders are bringing these discussions to multilateral forums such 
as the United Nations and regional institutions like the Organization of American States. 
Change is in the air. 
These discussions naturally lead to questions about what can reasonably be done and 
what we can expect to happen if certain policies are introduced. It is popular to inject an air 
of mystery into any debate about drug policy reform. The truth is that we know more than 
we think. There are approaches—including those in the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland 
and the Czech Republic—that have put the emphasis in their policies on public health, 
pragmatism, safety and security. We know what works based on what has been tried. And 
the Dutch model works. 
It may seem paradoxical that a nation famous for its so-called ‘permissive’ approach 
has had more positive outcomes in controlling the harms of drug use than many other 
countries that have enacted much stricter policies. While Dutch drug policy may be most 
renowned for its coffee shops, where cannabis is openly sold and consumed, the reasons 
behind this policy are less understood. 
This Dutch model was introduced as a pragmatic way of protecting cannabis users 
from exposure to harder drugs. The theory was that indiscriminate prohibition created a 
sub-culture in which users of drugs with vastly different risks are placed in the same milieu. 
Moreover, it was thought that saddling young people with criminal records might push 
them toward using harder drugs. As different drugs create different risks, the government 
sensibly surmised that all substances should not be treated the same. This is generally what 
is understood as a ‘separation of markets.’ 
A risk considered by Dutch policymakers was that people buying illicit marijuana 
would be in contact with those selling harder drugs. As designated commercial sources 
for marijuana evolved, it came to pass that drug users were much less likely to buy harder 
drugs from their cannabis sources. For example, in Sweden, 52 percent of marijuana users 
report that other drugs are available from their usual cannabis source. In the Netherlands, 
only 14 percent of marijuana users can get other drugs from their cannabis source.1  This 
is largely because the vast majority of cannabis users buy from coffee shops. In addition, 
these businesses generate around €400 million per year in tax revenues, according to some 
conservative estimates. 
By a number of indicators, the Dutch drug policy approach has been more successful 
than more repressive policies. One study found that people who use cannabis in Amsterdam 
are less likely to use cocaine than are marijuana users in the US. It said: “Only 22% of those 
[in Amsterdam] aged 12 and over who have ever used cannabis have also used cocaine … 
This compares to a figure of 33% for the United States.”2 
Furthermore, access to a commercial market for cannabis did not prompt the Dutch 
to become the world’s most prolific cannabis consumers. On the contrary, cannabis use 
stayed on par with European averages and remains far lower than in stricter environments 
like the United States. 
This study is not written to cast an exclusively favorable light on Dutch drug policy. 
While there are many successes, there are also challenges. There have been past public 
nuisance complaints against coffee shops as well as tension regarding supply of a substance 
never officially legalized. Yet how these challenges are dealt with is equally instructive. With 
its regulated approach to coffee shops, the Dutch have been able to rely on regulatory mecha-
nisms to address problems. 
However, nothing takes place in a vacuum and the Dutch approach is as vulnerable 
to politics as any policy. Interparty squabbles in a climate ripe for populism creates fissures 
that can lead to regressive drug policy approaches. At times, ambitious lawmakers or can-
didates have used drug policy as a wedge issue and in recent years, there have been various 
attempts to make the Dutch policy more restrictive. This paper explores some of the political 
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dimensions in the Netherlands around these discussions. Nevertheless, proponents of the 
international status quo would like to exploit any debates about drug policy in the Nether-
lands as being reflective of an admission of failure on the part of Dutch policymakers. This 
is a disingenuous attack on what has been a largely successful policy. As this paper shows, 
the conversations currently underway about marijuana policy in the Netherlands have very 
little to do with success, failure, public health or criminal justice. They are about politics. 
And that is where the main questions about the next steps arise. What comes next 
may actually not depend on outcomes but rather on leadership. Is there the political will to 
absorb what we’ve learned and carry them even further?
This is as true for the Netherlands as the entire international community.
Kasia Malinowska-Sempruch
Director, Global Drug Policy Program
Open Society Foundations
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Executive Summary
Building on a long history and culture of tolerance, the Dutch responded to illicit drugs 
with decades of pragmatic measures free of judgment. A central element of modern Dutch 
drug policy was a crucial decision to establish a legal and practical separation of cannabis—
judged to pose “acceptable” risks to consumers and society—from hard drugs associated 
with unacceptable risk. This policy effectively decriminalized possession and use of cannabis 
and opened the door for tolerated outlets for small-scale cannabis sales that eventually took 
the form of the well-known Dutch “coffee shops.” By all measures, the coffee shops suc-
ceeded in enabling cannabis consumers to avoid exposure to hard drug scenes and markets. 
Dutch cannabis consumers have also been spared the profound costs of carrying a criminal 
record, and the public has not had to bear the cost of incarceration for minor offenses. Drug 
policy in the Netherlands was characterized by a pragmatic bottom up development in which 
policies developed through trial and error at a local level often initiated by local officials in 
consultation with representatives from civil society who were supported by national policy 
makers.
With respect to heroin and other hard drugs, the Dutch government at national and 
municipal level put a premium on reduction of individual and social harm. This commit-
ment has been reflected in the government’s investment in comprehensive health and social 
services. Low-threshold methadone and safe consumption rooms as well as needle exchange 
programs proliferated earlier and with higher coverage than in most of Europe. Even before 
these services were established, however, tolerance for sale and consumption of illicit hard 
drugs in designated “house addresses” greatly reduced the dangers of an open drug scene, 
including exposure to uncontrolled criminal elements. It also contributed to a preference 
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for drug consumption not involving injection. The Netherlands was spared the major drug-
linked HIV epidemic that devastated drug users and their families in other European coun-
tries. An important element of this success, at times, was not only pragmatic national policy 
but also the degree of autonomy that municipal officials had to exercise of practices that did 
not conform to the letter of the law.
None of this was without its challenges. For example, while the coffee shops provided 
a venue for safe and controlled consumption of cannabis without exposing consumers to 
harmful hard drug scenes, successive governments have not successfully addressed the so-
called back door problem—coffee shops being supplied with cannabis by an illegal market. 
While there were instances of popular support for the complete legalization or government 
regulation of the cannabis market, which would address this problem, there were always 
political challenges to securing such a policy. Though confidently preserving the core of their 
policy and continuing to focus on reduction of individual and social drug-related harm, suc-
cessive Dutch governments have felt international pressure to not “step over the line” into 
areas such as legalization and regulation of drugs. In addition, attempts to address drug 
tourism by making coffee shops exclusive Dutch-only clubs seem to create more problems 
than they solve, evoking opposition from proprietors, patrons, civil society, legal experts and 
city mayors alike. Nevertheless, some municipalities continue to complain of drug tourism 
while enjoying the substantial revenue generated by coffee shops.
This report is an in-depth analysis of the politics and the practicalities that enabled 
or led the Dutch authorities at national and local levels to make the drug policy decisions 
that have shaped the lives of people who use or are otherwise affected by drugs in the Neth-
erlands. It is the authors’ hope that it will be of use to those outside the Netherlands, in 
government and civil society, who seek drug policy solutions that are respectful of human 
rights and based strongly in science and good public health practice. If there is one lesson to 
take away from the Dutch experience, it is that when taking steps toward regulating cannabis 
or other psychoactive substances meant for human consumption, these should include the 
entire chain of supply, from production to consumption.
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1. Introduction 
The Netherlands consistently features low prevalence of HIV among drug users, negligible 
incidence of heroin use, cannabis use among young people on par with the European aver-
age and a citizenry that has generally been spared the burden of criminal records for low-
level, non-violent drug offenses. How the Netherlands accomplished these goals is a matter 
of some debate. The Dutch drug policy model is often misrepresented or poorly understood. 
Its laudable public health programs are too often overshadowed by the publicity surrounding 
coffee shops, where cannabis is openly sold and consumed (a notable feature of the Dutch 
model but far from its principal characteristic). 
The essence of Dutch drug policy can be traced to one crucial policy change enacted 
into law in 1976: the separation of illicit drugs into those with “unacceptable” risk (list I, 
“hard drugs”) and those with “acceptable” risk (list II, soft drugs or cannabis) to the health 
of the user. This distinction effectively decriminalized the use of marijuana and hashish 
and initiated the beginning of a cannabis trade severed from the market for “harder” drugs. 
Around 1980, coffee shops, establishments where cannabis can be purchased and con-
sumed, were opened in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Utrecht. By the end of the 1990s cof-
fee shops could be found in almost every large or mid-sized Dutch city. The separation of 
markets also aimed to provide an environment where policies addressing increased heroin-
related problems could be more effective. Indeed, within 10 years of the enactment of the 
1976 law, the number of new heroin users dropped significantly (Toet, 1990; Grund, 1993; 
Van Brussel, 1995). 
In other words, by its own metrics, the policy worked. 
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As with any public policy, Dutch drug policy has had both intended and unanticipated 
consequences. Some of the latter have become highly debated issues in the country. For 
example, the nuisance from foreign customers around coffee shops in border regions and 
the involvement of criminal organizations in cannabis cultivation and wholesale supply 
resulted in the closing of some coffee shops in border towns and overall calls for tougher 
drug policies. Since 2000, policy has for various reasons shifted away from public health 
and increasingly toward more punitive approaches. This trend is however not uniform, as 
this report will document. 
1.1 Aims & Objectives
Critically examining Dutch drug policy over four decades, this report aims to:
1. Identify both the successful and less successful ingredients of the 1976 legal change, 
its overall effect on drug policy and its outcomes; and
2. Analyze these features within the context of Dutch society, history and politics.
The report does not address the use of ecstasy and other so-called “party drugs” that 
have become common on the Dutch scene, but rather focuses on cannabis and heroin. 
While this decision is made mainly due to space limitations, the influence of “party drugs” 
on Dutch drug policy involves a fairly complex set of additional questions that are beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
1.2 Methods
We conducted a thorough review of relevant key policy documents, research publications, 
scholarly literature, press reports, local, national and international reports, reports by civil 
society organizations, media publications and other grey literature on Dutch drug policy in 
general, and policies on cannabis and heroin related issues and on the Dutch “policy of toler-
ance” in particular. In addition, 20 face-to-face interviews were conducted with key national 
(drug) policymakers who each played a significant role in several decades of “separation of 
markets,” as well as with academic experts, civil society representatives, local and national 
politicians, harm reduction activists, policy advocates, a treatment service provider, a cof-
fee shop proprietor and representatives of law enforcement. Names and affiliations of the 
interviewees can be found in Annex 1. Relevant policy documents and research publications 
were reviewed, with an emphasis on important policy changes as well as outcomes of these 
policies. Policy documents and interviews were analyzed in conjunction. 
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2. Cannabis Policy
2.1 The Run-Up to the 1976 Law Change 
2.1.1 The Dutch and Drugs Before the 1960s
The Dutch relationship with psychoactive substances dates back to shortly after the foun-
dation of the “Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie” (VOC), or United Dutch East-Indies 
Company, in 1602. In the 17th century, the Dutch gained firm control over the opium trade 
in Asia. In response to leakages and illegal trade in opium and to international concerns 
about the rising use of opium, the Dutch government introduced the “Opium Regie,” in the 
Dutch Indies (present day Indonesia) in the 1890s (De Kort, 1995). This monopoly regulated 
the production and trade of opium, reinforcing Dutch control. The revenues from the opium 
monopoly contributed greatly to the wealth of cities such as Amsterdam and Leiden and 
ended with the Japanese invasion of the Dutch Indies in 1941. 
By the end of the 19th century, their renowned mercantilism led the Dutch to cultivate 
coca on the island of Java. In 1900, the “Nederlandsche Cocaïnefabriek” (Dutch Cocaine 
Factory) was established in Amsterdam. Ten years later, the Netherlands led the world’s 
cocaine market. Officially, cocaine was manufactured solely for medicinal purposes, but 
Dutch cocaine also ended up in recreational retail and, in particular, military markets (De 
Kort, 1995). Until the 1950s, few people used illicit drugs in the Netherlands. Hemp and 
hashish were included in the Opium Act in 1928, but only in 1953 did the possession and 
production of cannabis became a criminal offence in the Netherlands (Korf, 2002). 
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As in many other Western countries, the use of psychoactive substances increased 
rapidly in the 1960s, when young people started experimenting with cannabis, LSD and 
amphetamines. Dutch law enforcement authorities initially responded forcefully, aiming to 
repress not only drug trafficking but also drug use itself (Cohen, 1975; Korf, 2002). Drug 
arrests grew rapidly from 74 in 1966 to 544 in 1969 (Andere Tijden, 2004). According to 
Dirk Korf, Professor of Criminology at the University of Amsterdam (interview), this repres-
sive approach was widely criticized by the public and some politicians. Enforcement and 
successful prosecution proved to be both difficult and time consuming and did not result in 
a noticeable reduction in the availability or use of drugs. In 1969, the Public Prosecutor’s 
office published an enforcement guideline, shifting the focus of policing and prosecution 
away from cannabis use and towards the trafficking of cannabis and to substances such as 
LSD, amphetamine and opium (Andere Tijden, 2004). 
An important turning point in drug law enforcement came with the Holland Pop 
Festival in June 1970 in Rotterdam—the Dutch answer to the 1969 Woodstock festival. At 
this first-ever large-scale outdoor festival in the Netherlands, the police and mayor of Rotter-
dam opted for a softer approach to policing the crowd of 100,000, which, they noted, posed 
no immediate threat to public order. They decided just to observe the masses, rather than 
enforce the Opium Act by arresting every single cannabis-consuming young person. Police 
officers at the festival observed, firstly, that in the absence of enforcement drug transactions 
became quite visible, until eventually stalls were set up where drugs were sold. And secondly, 
different drugs (cannabis, LSD and amphetamines) were sold by different vendors. Appar-
ently, markets in illicit drugs were to some degree already segregated by substance. They 
saw that it was indeed possible for people to consume substances on a large scale without 
causing major risks to either themselves or public order. The absence of police arrests at this 
festival marked the dawn of more tolerant attitudes towards the use of psychoactive drugs, 
and cannabis in particular. The restrained policing at the festival may be considered the first 
large scale implementation of the 1969 Public Prosecutor’s office enforcement guideline. 
Subsequently, the authorities also began to tolerate so-called “house dealers” in venues fre-
quented by Dutch young people, which is described in greater detail below.
Until the early 1970s, cannabis sales remained underground and part of the Dutch 
counterculture, in which users sold to fellow users. Gradually, an informal policy of tolerance 
emerged around the use and transactions of amounts of cannabis associated with individual 
consumption. In addition, the attention of the police was soon to be diverted by heroin.
And then there was heroin
By 1972, the Amsterdam police had successfully intervened in the opium trade, mostly by 
deporting opium traffickers from Asia (Van Riessen, interview). Competing traffickers of 
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heroin filled the vacuum and, within months, heroin replaced opium in the Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam drug markets (Grund and Blanken, 1993; De Kort, 1995). The number of heroin 
users quickly increased as heroin was on its way to becoming the leading drug of concern 
in the Netherlands. 
Meanwhile, an influential 1969 study conducted by medical sociologist Herman 
Cohen cast doubts on the theory of cannabis as a “gateway drug” which assumes that users 
are compelled to progress from milder (cannabis) to harder drugs. However, participation in 
a marginalized sub-culture may familiarize cannabis users with other drugs and encourage 
their use (Cohen, 1975). A separation of the cannabis scene from that surrounding other 
drugs, Cohen argued, would prevent the cannabis users from exposure to harder drugs. 
Thus, the decriminalization of cannabis was greatly influenced by the emerging wave of 
hard drug use. 
A separation of the cannabis scene from that surrounding other drugs … would pre-
vent the cannabis users from exposure to harder drugs
The “Algemeen Centraal Bureau voor de Geestelijke Volksgezondheid,” the central 
authority for mental health—a non-governmental but influential advisory body to the gov-
ernment—commissioned a report from a panel dubbed the Hulsman committee. Reflecting 
on debates about social deviance that became prominent in Dutch academic literature at the 
time, the committee’s 1969 report proposed abolishing criminal sanctions on all drug use 
in the long run and to treat drug problems using a public health approach. It further rec-
ommended that the intensity of law enforcement be determined by the danger a substance 
presented to the individual and society. Cannabis was deemed a relatively mild drug. It was 
the setting, or social context, that determined the amount of risk associated with its use, 
and the marginalization resulting from criminal prosecution might cause cannabis users to 
switch to “harder, more dangerous” drugs like heroin (Hulsman Committee, 1969).
A second report from a separate panel, the Baan Committee, proved to be even more 
influential on government policy and provided the justification for the amendments to the 
Opium Act four years later. The 1972 Baan report focused mainly on cannabis and, for the 
first time, made a distinction between substances with an “unacceptable risk” and “other 
substances.” The committee re-emphasized that the risks particular substances pose to the 
individual and society ought to determine the severity of penalization (Baan Committee, 
1972; Hulsman Committee, 1969). Decriminalization of cannabis was proposed as the 
eventual goal, while penalties for hard drug trafficking and use were recommended to be 
increased. According to the Baan Committee, the negative effects of arrest and criminal 
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prosecution of cannabis users outweighed the possible benefits of punishment, not only to 
the individual user but also to public order. 
Interestingly, the essence of the Hulsman report—the shift from repressive enforce-
ment towards social and public health policies—was already reflected in the 1969 prosecu-
tion guidelines. According to Marcel de Kort, there were many links between the Hulsman 
and Baan committees on the one hand, and both the departments of Public Health and 
Justice. Professor Hulsman had also worked in and with the Department of Justice in various 
roles between 1955 and 1980. Decriminalization of cannabis was a widely supported notion, 
even within the Justice Department, as the prevailing opinion was that law enforcement 
should be the ultimum remedium. This represented an important shift in policy that would 
remain in force until the end of the 1990s.
Some respondents noted that the government at this time considered decriminalizing 
and regulating the supply of cannabis as well. Former Minister of Justice (and Prime Min-
ister) Dries van Agt explained that he and Minister of Health, Irene Vorrink, both wanted 
to go further than just decriminalizing cannabis: “We wanted to fully legalize cannabis and 
regulate all other drugs” (Van Agt, interview). Because of international pressure the cabinet 
decided differently and for the same reason possession of cannabis was not legalized, but 
merely decriminalized. It was not going to risk the relationships with neighboring countries 
and the international community any further. But it did intend to explore the feasibility of 
amending agreements, such as the Single Convention in a way that would allow nations to 
institute, at their discretion, separate regimes for cannabis products (De Kort, 1994).
Once other European nations saw the progress that was made, though, the Dutch 
government expected that other countries would emulate the policy, at least decriminalizing 
cannabis use (Lap, Polak, interviews).
2.2 The 1976 Revision of the Opium Act 
In 1976, the Opium Act was revised. With this revision, the Dutch government brought 
all substances classified in the United Nations’ 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 
under the new Opium Act, but introduced two lists of substances:
1. “substances with an unacceptable risk to the health of the user”
2. “cannabis products”
Charges for the possession of 30 grams of cannabis or less would either be dismissed 
or be charged as a petty offence or misdemeanor (comparable with a traffic ticket) which 
would not result in a criminal record (De Kort, 1995). 
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The use of drugs was and still is not a criminal offence in the Netherlands, but posses-
sion of any drug remained illegal under the new law, reflecting the government’s conviction 
that use of cannabis was not without some risk. Likewise, in addition to the law’s recognition 
of differing risks another distinction was made between possession intended for personal 
consumption and possession with intent to distribute. The government intentionally did 
not reduce mere possession of hard drugs to a misdemeanor, as they wanted to keep open 
the option of compulsory treatment for heroin-dependent people. The new Opium Act fur-
ther formalized the policing and prosecution policies reflected in the 1969 enforcement 
guideline of the Public Prosecutor’s office, when the police stopped enforcing possession 
for personal use of any substance. 
The development of drug policy was now formally coordinated by the Ministry of 
Health. The Ministry of Justice did not aspire to a leading role in drug policy in these days, 
as it subscribed to the governing view that drug use and addiction should be treated primar-
ily by medical and social approaches rather than criminal justice (thanks to the influence of 
the aforementioned committees).
2.2.1 Expediency Principle and Political Structures
Shortly after the revision of the Opium Act, in 1977, the guidelines were altered to give the 
“local triangle” (consisting of the mayor of a municipality, the public prosecutor and the chief 
of police) the power to decide whether or not to prosecute small-scale sales of cannabis (De 
Kort, 1995), reflecting what in the Dutch legal system is known as the expediency principle. 
A public prosecutor in the Netherlands may lawfully decide to forgo criminal prosecution 
under the expediency principle when it is deemed not opportune, or not in the public inter-
est, and may instruct the police to act accordingly (Korf, 2002). This approach has become 
the cornerstone of the Dutch approach to cannabis and drug use, as criminal prosecution of 
cannabis users was judged to not serve the public interest (Korf, 2002). Within the context 
of drug policy, then, law enforcement yields to public health, but also to public order. The 
expediency principle paved the way for the coffee shops and other further developments in 
Dutch drug policy, reflecting the Dutch tradition of pragmatism and tolerance. 
Another important aspect of Dutch policy is that the Dutch value individual freedom 
and open debate, in particular on controversial ethical issues. Influential 18th century states-
man Jan Rudolf Thorbecke wrote that “transparency is the great, general school of political 
education.” Since the Dutch feel strongly about inclusion and protecting the public good, 
there is an extensive system of social and health care in place (Keulen & Van de Mheen, 
2008). Importantly, already in the 1960s, this pragmatic, inclusive and non-moralizing 
attitude to politics and policy making allowed for the input of many voices in the debate 
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about the country’s drug policy—from academics to NGOs and cannabis users themselves.3 
The policy of tolerance and the use of the expediency principle were not invented in 1976. 
On the contrary, the Dutch had ages of experience with tolerating diverging viewpoints and 
unconventional conduct. Indeed, the 1976 revision of the Opium Act “sanctioned” the prac-
tice that had emerged by trial and error in the decade before.
3. The voice of hard drug users was not heard until 1980 when the Rotterdam based ‘Junk-
iebond’ was founded.
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3. Regulating Emerging 
 Practice: Policy Development 
 After 1976 
3.1 Cannabis Sales Before the Coffee Shops
3.1.1 Sales in Concert Venues and Youth Centers
The 1960s were an economically prosperous time in the Netherlands and a time of mass 
secularization, in which traditional cultural and youth associations were no longer of inter-
est to many Dutch adolescents (Bogt and Hibbel, 2000). Illicit drug use first emerged in 
these middle-class youth cultures. Despite the social upheaval of the late 1960s, most youth 
cultures were mainstream at the time but the heroin scene appeared among an early post-
war underground youth subculture. 
If the use and underground trade among people within the 1960s counterculture 
marked the first phase of cannabis sales in the Netherlands, sale in facilities where young 
people gathered can be regarded as the second stage (Korf, 2008). By around 1970, soft 
drugs were used and sold rather openly, although not aggressively, and without substantial 
police intervention in music venues in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. While the 
government felt that the law ought to be held up, they could not ignore the social reality 
and feared that enforcing the law by closing youth meeting places could lead to the spread 
of cannabis dealing to seedier areas of Amsterdam. This might expose cannabis users to 
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hard drugs, which was deemed an unacceptable consequence (De Kort, 1995). Eventually, 
as was confirmed by our respondents (Polak, Lap, interviews), the venue staff and its NGO 
boards tolerated so-called “house dealers,” whom they knew and trusted, renting a table in 
a corner of these—often government subsidized—youth centers and music venues, where 
they sold hashish and marijuana. By 1977, the public prosecutor’s office had decided to make 
prosecuting house dealers a low priority, and the number of house dealers in these venues 
skyrocketed (De Kort, 1995). 
3.2 And Then There Were Coffee Shops
“Coffee shops just originated. I don’t recall this ever being a topic at the Department. 
They just emerged.” (Engelsman, interview) 
While politics focused on the sales of cannabis in pop podia and youth centers, the first com-
mercial cannabis outlets were already emerging. One of the first, in 1972, was a “tea house”4 
in Amsterdam called Mellow Yellow, where instead of selling from behind a counter, the 
dealer posed as a customer in front of the bar. The outfit kept a low profile, did not advertise 
and opened only after 6 p.m. (Schoof, 2008). 
In 1975, Rusland and The Bulldog opened in Amsterdam, the first to be called coffee 
shops (Bruining, 2010). Where Mellow Yellow initially aimed at providing their friends (and 
friends of friends) with cannabis, Henk de Vries, founder of The Bulldog, turned the idea 
into a commercial concept and started selling cannabis from early morning to late in the 
evening (Ibid.). As long as cannabis wasn’t traded in an overt manner, the police wouldn’t 
bother these shops. Meanwhile, shops such as The Bulldog actively aimed to avoid becoming 
a public nuisance in the neighborhoods where they were located. They also soon established 
house rules, for example against hard drugs. 
Coffee shops expanded and became visible only in the early 1980s. Compared to youth 
centers or apartment dealers, coffee shops had longer, fixed opening hours and a broader, 
more consistent supply of cannabis. Furthermore, budget cuts during the economic crisis 
of the early 1980s spurred the closure of many youth centers, which pushed cannabis users 
to the nascent coffee shops. 
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  4, `Tea’ is also a reference to the 1940s slang for marijuana.
The Dutch government would not forcefully respond with regulations for coffee shops 
until the early 1990s. This reactive and restrained stance allowed for pragmatism in dealing 
with the emerging coffee shops, which were (and are)—literally—in conflict with Dutch law. 
It is clear that the appearance of coffee shops was not anticipated by the 1976 Opium Act 
revisions. When the coffee shops emerged it was decided through case law that the tolerance 
criteria developed for house dealers would be applied to these new establishments (Korf, 
2002). Bos (2008) compared government attitudes toward coffee shops to the tolerance 
of 17th century underground Catholic churches in the Protestant Netherlands: the govern-
ment knew what was going on, but as long as they weren’t visible to the public, they could 
be tolerated.
3.2.1 Guidelines and Criteria for Coffee Shops
Used “off-the-record” since 1978 (Blom, 1998), new guidelines for the Opium Act were 
officially published in 1979 (Korf, 2008). “Police would only interfere if small-scale trade 
was publicly advertised or otherwise provocatively effectuated” (Staatscourant, 1980). These 
guidelines generated a special position for house dealers at youth centers, when working 
“with the trust and under protection of the staff of a youth center” (Blom, 1998). Marcel 
de Kort (1995) hypothesizes that these new guidelines provided the legal leeway for coffee 
shops. However, lacking specificity, the guidelines left it unclear under which circumstances 
and criteria police should enforce the rules (Jansen, 1989). While some coffee shops were 
mostly left in peace, others were raided regularly (De Kort, 1995). None of this, however, 
hindered the steady rise in the number of coffee shops throughout the 1980s. 
Pioneered in Amsterdam, the AHOJ-G criteria were to be introduced nationally in 
1991, but were only officially enacted in 1994 (Staatscourant 1994: 203). The initial AHOJ-
G criteria were formulated in rather broad terms, leaving room for interpretation by the 
municipalities. AHOJ-G is an acronym for the following set of criteria: 
 A, no Advertising: no more than (very) low profile signposting of the facility; 
 H, no Hard drugs: these may not be sold or held on the premises;
 O, no Nuisance (Overlast in Dutch): including traffic and parking, loitering, littering 
and noise;
 J, no sales to under-aged customers (Jeugdigen in Dutch) and no admittance of under-
aged customers to coffee-shops;
 G, transaction size is limited to ‘personal use,’ defined as 30 Grams per person per 
coffee shop per day.
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When coffee shops started appearing, there was no Dutch-grown marijuana worth 
speaking of. According to economist Adriaan Jansen (2002) most coffee shops provided 
high-quality hashish until 1990, and interest in home-grown cannabis was low. With a few 
exceptions, growing marijuana was not very profitable. However, Dutch cultivators began 
growing different and more potent varieties, starting with the now famous Skunk (Niesink 
& Rigter, 2012). Indoor cultivation meant year-round harvests, higher yields and lower risk 
of discovery by police and thieves. Furthermore, breeding new strains was not against the 
Opium Act, and still isn’t. Within a decade “over 80% of the internal demand for cannabis 
in the Netherlands was met through domestic production” (Jansen, 2002). By 2006, there 
were an estimated 200 wholesalers and 375 grow shops in the country, and Dutch-grown 
cannabis acquired an international reputation and market (Maalsté, 2007). These develop-
ments were not lost on the government. 
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4. At the Other Side of the Fence: 
 The Dutch Hard Drug
 Epidemic, 1972–Present
4.1 Introduction
In the 1970s the focus of Dutch drug policy turned to heroin after it flooded the streets of 
Amsterdam, Rotterdam and then various provincial capitals. Until then, drug policy discus-
sions focused on decriminalization of all drugs (e.g. the Hulsman committee) or cannabis 
and the status and health of its users (the Baan committee). The practical imperative of 
policy soon became to keep young people, cannabis users in particular, away from heroin. 
Thus, the policy objective became (to reinforce) the separation between cannabis scenes and 
the evolving street heroin scenes (De Kort, 1995). 
This analysis focuses mainly on Amsterdam, the capital of the Netherlands, and, 
Rotterdam, Europe’s biggest harbor, though other cities eventually experienced similar prob-
lems. Importantly, the hard drug epidemic in the Netherlands is not a single-drug but a 
multi-drug epidemic. The problematic use5 of heroin and cocaine are intricately interwoven 
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5. Problem drug use is defined as ‘injecting drug use or long-duration/regular use of opi-
oids, cocaine and/or amphetamines’ (http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/themes/key-indicators/pdu).
since cocaine emerged and “nested” in the heroin-using population around 1982 and not 
within a new age cohort of Dutch youth, previously uninvolved in hard drug use (Grund, 
1993). Therefore, when using the term hard drug use in this chapter, we refer to problem 
use of heroin and/or cocaine.
4.2 Interwoven Epidemics of Heroin and Cocaine Use 
In the 40-year-old Dutch hard drug epidemic we can distinguish four waves of new users, 
differing in social-demographic profiles or the social ecology of drug markets. These were: 
(i) 1972, with the onset of heroin use in the Netherlands; (ii) 1975, when the former Dutch 
colony Suriname gained independence and a large number of young Surinamese men came 
to the Netherlands, some of whom become entangled in the problem; (iii) 1980, when drug 
markets in Amsterdam and Rotterdam started leaving the inner cities and moved into apart-
ments in working class neighborhoods outside the city center and heroin diffused across the 
country; and (iv) the rise of cocaine smoking within the heroin-using population.
4.2.1 The 1970s: Onset, Incubation and towards Widespread 
  Diffusion of Heroin Use
The emergence of heroin was largely an unintended consequence of the dismantling of 
Amsterdam’s opium trade. Hard drugs in the Netherlands in the early 1970s were largely 
situated in the hippie subculture. Among Dutch hippies, experimentation with hallucino-
gens, amphetamines and other drugs were common, with heroin only emerging on the 
fringes in the summer of 1972. Subsequently, heroin also popped up in certain nightlife 
spots in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, attracting new users among working class youth and 
the first generations of immigrants from Suriname (Janssen and Swierstra, 1982; Grund 
and Blanken, 1993).
By the second half of the 1970s, heroin was the first drug to be experienced as a social 
problem in Dutch society and became the object of the first moral drug panic in the Nether-
lands. At the end of the decade, several Dutch cities housed large open air drug scenes at and 
around specific bars, street corners, bridges or shopping malls. Frederick Polak, consultant 
psychiatrist at the Amsterdam Municipal Drug Service between 1990 and 2003, noted: “In 
Amsterdam, there were repeated raids of users and small dealers on the Zeedijk. The mind-
set of the police back then was ‘we have to chase them and lock them up’” (Polak, interview). 
Despite these efforts, street scenes continued to grow and mobilized the wrath of residents 
of affected neighborhoods. In response, by around 1980, the (local) police started to repress 
and disperse the large street heroin markets. The heroin scenes then moved to working-
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class neighborhoods that were scheduled for urban renewal (Grund & Blanken, 1993; Van 
Brussel, 1995). This had several unintended consequences—both negative and positive.
4.2.2 The 1980s: Off the Streets and Into Apartments
Nineteen-eighty was a significant year and perhaps even the principal tipping point 
(Gladwell, 2000) in the Dutch hard drug epidemic. The emerging economic crisis and 
resulting unemployment hit many adolescents in the same working class neighborhoods 
where hard drug dealers were settling. The majority of heroin dealers had left the streets 
and set up shop inside, “renting” a room in the apartments of hard drug users (who were 
mostly compensated with a daily ration of cocaine and heroin) or moving into abandoned 
housing. Heroin no longer had to be purchased from an unknown street dealer, but could 
now be had and consumed in the protected and discrete environment of “house addresses” 
around the corner (Grund and Blanken, 1993; Grapendaal et al., 1991). This low-threshold 
situation resulted in heroin rapidly diffusing into these working class neighborhoods, affect-
ing both native Dutch and immigrant families (De Vos, 1984; Grund, 1993; Van Brussel, 
1995). Merging with the economic crisis and the urban renewal process, this provoked the 
third wave of heroin use in the Netherlands (Grund and Blanken, 1993; Swierstra, Janssen 
and Jansen, 1986; Van Brussel, 1995).
By 1982 powder cocaine also slowly started making its way into the heroin scene and 
soon both heroin and cocaine could be bought at the same “house address” locations, which 
also provided the chemicals and utensils necessary to produce crack cocaine (although this 
term never caught on in the Netherlands) (Grapendaal et al., 1991; Grund, Adriaans and 
Kaplan, 1991). However, since cocaine was generally consumed indoors with heroin out 
of public view, the emergence of cocaine smoking became an issue for the drug treatment 
system only more than ten years later. The introduction of cocaine smoking also qualifies as 
a tipping point as it prolonged the careers of Dutch hard drug users and attracted new users 
to the scene, but its effects were moderated by these protective factors (Kaplan et al., 1990). 
Consumption of heroin and cocaine in house addresses was also dominated by “chasing the 
dragon,” a method of smoking with comparable effect to injecting but without the harms of 
injection, such as the transmission of blood borne viruses. Thus, from the early 1980s on, 
fewer and fewer new hard drug users initiated injecting (Grund, Adriaans and Kaplan, 1991; 
Grund et al., 1992b). In 2010, only 9 percent of the problem heroin users in Amsterdam 
inject (van den Brink, 2010), a ratio not very different from elsewhere in the Netherlands. 
At the same time, young people in the Netherlands were exposed to many messages in 
popular culture, including in music, that highlighted the harms of heroin addiction, and they 
observed for themselves the differences in the hard and soft drug scenes. As Korf (interview) 
noted: “The visibility of these people [users of hard drugs], since we didn’t send them all to 
jail, also helped, as it provided negative role models, like ‘I do not want to be like them.’” 
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Throughout the 1980s, the police continued putting pressure on street markets, 
but after realizing that the heroin scene had moved inside and resulted in less nuisance 
on city streets, local governments and police decided to tolerate this situation, an “off the 
record” practice that would continue far into the 1990s. In fact, in some cities the police 
and neighborhood organizations actively collaborated with dealers at the house addresses 
(Blanken and Adriaans, 1993; Grund and Blanken, 1992; Grund, 1993). André Beckers, a 
former police officer in Arnhem and attorney who specialized in cannabis cases, explains 
that police officers in neighborhoods with many house addresses developed an unofficial 
policy of tolerance and discretion, making agreements with the dealers or proprietors in 
order to contain nuisance: 
“The biggest complaint in my neighborhood was that customers rang the wrong buzzer, so 
I [as the local policeman] agreed with the dealers to affix little stickers next to their buzzer. 
I rewarded them with clean needles and syringes and also rewarded them when they cleared the 
playground of discarded syringes. People complain about nuisance, not about the use of drugs.” 
4.2.3 The 1990s: From Heroin to Crack and the Demise of the House 
  Addresses 
In the second half of the 1980s, the first signs were observed in the larger cities that the 
heroin epidemic was declining (Toet, 1990; Grund, 1993; Van Brussel, 1995), although it 
continued to diffuse to smaller cities and rural areas (Korf, Mann & Van Aalderen, 1989; 
Korf, 1990). During the 1980s and 1990s, house addresses moved from one neighbor-
hood to the other, basically following the agenda of the local urban planners (Blanken and 
Hendriks, 1996). However, increasing complaints and subsequent police raids resulted in 
a circular process toward more users on the streets, with associated increases in street-level 
nuisance (Grund, Adriaans and Kaplan, 1991). 
In 1995, the Rotterdam Municipal Health Authority drew up a set of tolerance criteria 
for small-scale house addresses, where drugs could both be bought and consumed inside 
(Barendregt, Schenk, & Vollemans, 2001). Using the expediency principle, in the following 
years the police did not intervene in house addresses that met these criteria (Van de Mheen 
and Gruter, 2004). After a change in Dutch municipal law in 1997, the Rotterdam mayor 
could close down residences that created a public nuisance and evict their tenants. Soon 
thereafter dozens of dealing addresses were closed, which once again moved the drug trade 
into open air street markets (Barendregt, Blanken and Zuidmulder, 2000). But by then, the 
population of hard drug users was aging rapidly and combined measures of treatment, care, 
harm reduction and measured repression helped to get most problematic drug users from 
the streets and into services and sheltered housing (see 6.2). 
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5. The Nineties: Continuity and 
 Change
5.1 New Directions in Cannabis Policy
In 1995, the “Purple Government”6 published an official policy document called Dutch Drug 
Policy: Continuity and Change. On the one hand, this important inter-ministerial policy paper 
represented continuity in that it recognized that the separation of soft and hard drugs in 
policy had been achieved and that the coffee shops were instrumental in this success (TK 24 
077 no 3, 1995). It highlighted that this success was directly measurable in the low number 
of persons, especially young people, addicted to hard drugs compared to the rest of Europe 
(see also Kuipers, 1993). On the other hand, it was the first national policy document to 
take up the issue of nuisance associated with coffee shops. The paper emphasized that 
some coffee shops were under the influence of criminal organizations and that in some 
places local residents complained about loitering customers, pollution, parking problems, 
and so on. It asserted that the presence of coffee shops in the vicinity of schools demanded 
more attention from law enforcement. The government also expressed concern about its 
international reputation and worried that it could become an “export nation of cannabis.” 
(TK 24 077 no 3, 1995).
6. A coalition formed by Social Democrat and Liberal parties, the first government without 
a Christian Democratic Party in 80 years.
Continuity and Change ushered in a tightening of regulations for coffee shops, includ-
ing a minimum admission age of 18 years nationally. The maximum transaction amount was 
decreased from 30 to 5 grams per person per day, and a limit was put on the trading stock 
kept in the shop. While the upper limit was left to the local authorities, a stock of 500 grams 
or less would not trigger enforcement by national authorities (Korf et al., 1999). According 
to our respondents, the upper limit was rather arbitrary and not justified by, for example, the 
level of sales in the shops (Beckers, Bos, interviews; Eerenbeemt & Visser, 1995). In 1995 it 
was also announced that coffee shops would become “dry” facilities—i.e. alcohol-free—but 
this rule was implemented only in 2000 (Bieleman et al., 2008). Municipalities in addition 
obtained the power to add further local directives, such as a minimum distance to schools 
(e.g. a 250 or 350 meter minimum), or bylaws stipulating business hours and zoning criteria 
(Bieleman et al., 2006). 
5.2 Drug Tourism and International Relations
Many of the new restrictions were passed under pressure from neighboring countries, the 
UN International Narcotics Control Board (Van der Stel, 1999; Boekhout van Solinge, 2010) 
and some segments of the media (Wiedemann, 1994). 
The Schengen Agreement, a treaty signed in 1985, effectively abolished border con-
trols between many European countries. In subsequent years, cannabis tourism to the Neth-
erlands increased substantially in the border regions with Germany and Belgium, and so 
did the complaints about nuisance from local residents. Changes, such as the reduction 
in the maximum allowable amount for daily individual possession and purchase in coffee 
shops (from 30 to 5 grams), were in direct response to the increasing nuisance and aimed 
at discouraging foreign drug shoppers.
5.3 Getting Tough
Continuity and Change sought to reduce the influence of organized crime in the supply of 
the coffee shops as much as possible, by giving small scale, non-professional home cultiva-
tion low enforcement priority. In the beginning of the 2000s, however, law enforcement 
increasingly started focusing on cannabis cultivation, a development that continues as of 
this writing. When police started deploying anonymous tip-lines and cooperating with, for 
example, housing associations, insurance companies, electricity companies and banks, can-
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nabis cultivation quickly lost its attraction to small-time home growers wanting to avoid 
a criminal record or home eviction. These steps may have only further pushed cannabis 
growing into economically less fortunate neighborhoods, where more and more unemployed 
people grew cannabis to support their income, increasingly managed by criminal organiza-
tions. According to Boekhout van Solinge (2010), the government’s stricter approach trig-
gered the scale-up and criminalization of the cannabis supply side. 
The government’s stricter approach triggered the scale-up and criminalization of the 
cannabis supply side
The Opium Act guidelines regarding coffee shops contained a major ambiguity: a low 
enforcement priority for possession for personal amounts of soft drugs and a high priority 
on trade and cultivation of larger quantities. This created the so-called “back-door problem”: 
coffee shops were exempted from prosecution for the sale of small quantities (the front 
door), but still liable to criminal prosecution for the purchase of large quantities of cannabis 
(the back door). Jeroen Bos, long time coffee shop proprietor, summarizes the back door 
problem as follows: “As proprietor you have to comply with many rules and checks on the 
one side, while at the other side you hardly have any rights, under the motto ‘you are toler-
ated, and you knew this when you started your business’.” 
Former Minister of Health Hedy D’Ancona explained the lack of regulating the back 
door in terms of what was politically possible. When the Dutch policy on drugs was being 
shaped in the 1970s and 1980s, “we were already so happy with what we had, that we did 
not realize which problems we were also getting” (interview). Besides, coalition parties were 
never very willing to move forward on this policy file. Dries van Agt, who was Minister of 
Justice in 1971–1977, said the government first wanted to show that the number of cannabis 
consumers would not rise drastically and that they could consume their cannabis in a safe 
environment. The governing idea was that separating the users markets made so much 
sense that soon other nations would follow (Everhardt, interview). When international pres-
sure was heavier than expected, the idea to regulate cultivation and introduce a closed system 
for the purchase and sales of hashish and marijuana was abandoned.
The first estimate of the total number of coffee shops in the country, in 1995 (TK 24 
077 no 3, 1995), put the number of coffee shops at around 1200, with some 900 additional 
illegal points of sale, although no official figures exist. This was clearly too much for the gov-
ernment. “The first thing I did in 1995, was to order municipalities to close down hundreds 
of coffee shops. There were too many, which meant that some started selling hard drugs as 
well. They apparently lacked revenue due to the high competition” (Else Borst-Eilers, former 
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Minister of Health, interview). Since then, the number of coffee shops in the Netherlands 
has been steadily declining, to 846 in 2000 and 666 in 2009 (Bieleman and Goeree, 2000; 
Bieleman et al., 2005; Bieleman & Nijkamp, 2010). Moreover, in 1996 local municipalities 
were given the discretionary power to allow coffee shops in their municipality or not. About 
69 percent of all municipalities have a so-called “zero policy” (allowing no coffee shops), 
while about one in four municipalities allow coffee shops (Bieleman & Nijkamp, 2010). Over 
half (53 percent) of all coffee shops are located in the five largest communities (> 200,000 
inhabitants). Although only 5 percent of the national population lives in Amsterdam, the 
city is home to one-third of all coffee shops in the country (Bieleman & Nijkamp, 2010). 
While it moved towards somewhat stricter policies on recreational cannabis use after 
1995, the Netherlands did become the first country to legalize cannabis use for medicinal 
purposes in 2000 (Hazekamp, 2006; Holland, 2010). Since 2003, medicinal cannabis has 
been available in pharmacies for a number of medical conditions as prescribed by a physi-
cian. The prescribed cannabis is produced domestically, overseen by the Office for Medicinal 
Cannabis.
5.4 Policy Making At Work: Competing Policy 
  Interests & the Politics of Compromise
Drug policy in the 1970s and 1980s was mainly dominated by public health issues, such as 
heroin injection and HIV. But this only partly explains why steps to further legally regulate 
coffee shops were not made. The Department of Justice traditionally had little interest in 
the topic, as coordination rested with the Minister of Health, including chairing the Inter-
Departmental Steering Group on Drugs. But, as drug related health problems became more 
manageable, other issues, such as nuisance and crime, competed for political attention. 
Furthermore, the Dutch law enforcement sector saw itself increasingly exposed to zero-
tolerance attitudes of European countries with much more punitive approaches to drug use. 
In the 1990s Dutch drug policy was increasingly characterized by compromise—
in international relations but also within political coalitions, most notably during the two 
Purple Cabinets (1994–2002). Political opposition and the lack of visibility put cannabis 
legalization, or further regulation, low on the list of policy priorities. Moreover, the main 
focus of drug policy remained heroin. 
With regard to public health and harm reduction, I mostly occupied myself with heroin. 
This already took a lot of political haggling, as the VVD (Liberal Party) was rather opposed 
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to heroin assisted treatment. Only after I left did heroin become a registered medicine. Coffee 
shops were not our priority. Besides, the opinion was that further liberalization is undoable 
if you can’t get neighboring countries to side with you (Borst-Eilers, interview). 
Though the focus of policy making shifted to fighting organized crime and nuisance 
in the second half of the 1990s, the coordination of Dutch drug policy remained within the 
Department of Health. Only in the 21st century did this “balance of power” in drug policy 
shift towards the Justice Department.
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6. Changing Tides—Dutch Drug 
 Policy in the 21st Century 
With the advent of right-wing, populist politicians such as Pim Fortuyn, tolerance for edgy 
social issues was decreasing. Indeed, the whole idea of tolerance was increasingly ques-
tioned. Although Pim Fortuyn was actually in favor of legalizing drugs, populist parties 
turned their attention to drugs (as well as immigration) as rallying points. In response to 
the emerging populism, conventional parties, such as the CDA and, in particular, the VVD, 
not only hardened their positions on immigration, but also on drug policy. The strong per-
formance of the populist parties in the 2002 national elections resulted in greater emphasis 
on repressive measures both nationally and locally, including on cannabis policy. 
After eight years of “Purple” governments, the 2002 Parliamentary elections brought 
a coalition of right-wing and Christian Democratic parties into power. Between 2002 and 
2010, four subsequent Cabinets under Christian Democratic Prime Minister Jan-Peter 
Balkenende created an increasingly harsh social-political discourse around drugs and coffee 
shops in particular. The repressive direction of policy was continued by Rutte 1 in 2010—a 
minority coalition of VVD (Liberals) and CDA (Christian Democrats), tolerated by the Geert 
Wilders’ populist right wing PVV (Freedom Party). 
The first Cabinet, which lasted only 86 days, named its coalition agreement “Towards 
a Safer Society” and expressed the intent to reduce the presence of coffee shops in the vicin-
ity of schools and border areas as well as criminal involvement in the shops. Although the 
Ministry of Health was still the lead ministry in name in 2012, in practice the Ministry of 
Security and Justice took the lead in drug policy (Blickman, 2012). 
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6.1 (No) Experiments with Regulation
In the 2000 policy paper Het pad naar de achterdeur (The Path to the Back Door), the Minis-
ter of Justice wrote that the Purple Government had no intention to expand the policy of tol-
erance towards regulated or legalized cultivation of cannabis (TK 24 077, no. 75, 1999/2000) 
as that would be incompatible with international treaties and would cause problems with 
enforcement. Organizing a closed system for the production and distribution of cannabis 
in an open economy was judged impossible (Van der Stel et al., Everhardt et al., in Van Laar 
and Van Ooyen-Hoeben, 2009). Shortly thereafter, a parliamentary motion requesting the 
government develop guidelines for the cultivation of cannabis was accepted by a margin of 
only one vote (TK 24 077, no. 75, 1999/2000) but never executed by the Cabinet. Likewise, 
in both 1999 and 2008 a large number of mayors, of all political stripes, requested the 
Cabinet regulate the production and supply of cannabis to coffee shops. Another combined 
parliamentary-municipal initiative, the Manifest of Maastricht (09-12-2005), requested the 
government allow experiments with regulated cannabis cultivation, but was abandoned in 
June 2006 when the VVD withdrew its initial support. None of these initiatives were sup-
ported by the national government (TK 24 077 no. 179, 2006), which cited a study by the 
Asser Institute (2005) suggesting that international treaties did not leave room for experi-
mentation. Years later, it was questioned in parliament whether a first draft of the report, 
which stated that such experiments were not at odds with international treaties, was with-
held by the government (h-tk-20112012-69-8, 2011/2012). Reportedly, the Department of 
Justice changed the document to suit the government’s position after receiving the first draft 
of the report (Althuisius & Driessen, 2012; Polak, interview). 
6.2 The 2004 ‘Cannabis Letter’ 
In 2004, the Ministries of Health, Justice and Internal Affairs issued the “Cannabis Letter,” 
which re-emphasized the three pillars of Dutch drugs policy; the protection of health, com-
bating nuisance, and fighting drug related crime. Importantly, the paper stated that “The 
primacy of policy lies with the protection of health” but at the same time it declared the 
intent to focus on reducing street trade, drug tourism and professional cannabis cultivation 
(MinVWS, 2004). Referring to THC, the principal psychoactive constituent of cannabis, the 
paper mentioned the option of “moving varieties with higher THC content onto List I of 
the Opium Act,” if these were associated with increased health risks. Decriminalizing and 
regulating the cultivation and distribution of cannabis were not an option for regulating 
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THC content, the government wrote, as this would require legalization, which “given the 
international obligations of the Netherlands is not an option” (MinVWS, 2004). 
Coffee shop policy was further decentralized to the local authorities, emphasizing the 
focus on nuisance. The letter reiterated the desire to further reduce the already declining 
number of coffee shops—in particular near schools—and appealed to municipalities to use 
the available enforcement instruments more effectively (Bieleman et al., 2008). This further 
reduction was to be monitored carefully to prevent the “precarious balance” from sliding to 
non-tolerated sales of cannabis (MinVWS, 2004). 
6.3 The Damocles, Victor and BIBOB Acts 
The options for administrative enforcement were significantly increased with the addition 
to the Opium Act of the Damocles Act (article 13b) in 1999 and the Victor Act in 2002. The 
Damocles Act gives mayors the power to close down coffee shops—rather arbitrarily—if 
they fear “disruption of public order by, for example, drug users and drug dealers or when 
safety or the health of local residents are at issue as a result of drug use or trade” (Bieleman 
et al., 2008). The Victor Act further facilitated the repressive approach by intensifying the 
cooperation between law enforcement, energy companies, housing corporations and other 
arms of the municipal administration, resulting in, for example, evictions or lease termina-
tions where cannabis cultivation is detected. 
The “Wet Bevordering Integriteitsbeoordelingen door het Openbaar Bestuur,” (Promotion 
of Integrity Assessments by the Public Administration Act) or “BIBOB” aims to prevent 
coffee shop permits going to proprietors with ties to criminal organizations. Due to the 
front-door/back-door paradox, it is unsurprising that many coffee shops do have contacts 
with criminal entrepreneurs. Lawyers representing coffee shop owners argued that these 
instruments lack transparency as action can be taken without the intervention of a judge 
(Beckers, interview).
In 2008, police sources were claiming that 80 percent of the marijuana cultivated 
in the Netherlands, estimated at 500,000 kg, was grown for exportation. On national TV 
the Chief of the Taskforce Against Organized Marijuana Cultivation (Aanpak Georgani-
seerde Hennepteelt) also claimed that the size of indoor growing would cover the province 
of Utrecht if farmed outside. These claims were reportedly based on a confidential 2006 
“study” by the Dutch national police force and were recited numerous times thereafter in 
media, in Parliament and by the government. These numbers soon became accepted fact, “an 
idea widely accepted as true by both the public and (media) ‘experts,’ but unexamined and 
[used to] preserve the status quo.” (Galbraith, 1958) Until in 2012, investigative TV journal-
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ists (Reporter, broadcast 2 March 2012; Althuisius & Driessen, 2012) got their hands on the 
KLPD report and proved that the report (KLPD, 2006) in fact suggested that there was not 
a shred of proof in support of the previously cited numbers and that even the KLPD itself 
doubted that Europe was overflowing with Dutch cannabis (Buruma, 2008; Reporter, 2012; 
Althuisius & Driessen, 2012).
Whatever the actual extent of cultivation and export, focusing detection and prosecu-
tion on home growers meant that smaller targets in the trafficking hierarchy were caught 
first, which left the market open to competitors with less to lose from a criminal record 
and more resources to avoid detection (Boekhout van Solinge, 2010; Bos, interview). This 
provided both the incentive and leeway for criminal organizations with significantly more 
means and money to stay ahead of law enforcement. According to several of our respondents 
this created a self-fulfilling prophesy: the government was apparently reinforcing a problem 
it was trying to fight— drug-related organized crime.
6.4 Policy Evaluations and Advisory Committees
Two-thousand-nine was a busy year for Dutch drug policy, as three evaluations of the policy 
were published. The Ministries of Health, Justice and Internal Affairs collectively issued 
Geen deuren maar daden (‘No Doors but Deeds’), the report of the Advisory Committee 
on Drug Policy (‘Van de Donk Committee`). The National Institute for Public Health and 
Environment (RIVM) published Een ranking van drugs (‘A Ranking of Drugs’). Evaluatie van 
het Nederlandse Drugsbeleid (Evaluation of the Dutch Drug Policy), a study conducted by the 
Trimbos Institute (the Netherlands Institute on Mental Health and Addiction), was issued 
by the Ministry of Justice. In the previous year, the “Coordination Unit Assessment and 
Monitoring of New Drugs” (CAM)7 published a new assessment of the risks associated with 
THC percentages in cannabis. 
[S]weeping reforms of current policy measures – e.g. abolishing the coffee shops – were 
undesirable and potentially harmful to public health
7. The CAM has been part of the RIVM (National Institute for Public Health and Environ-
ment) since 2000.
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The CAM report asserted that sweeping reforms of current policy measures—e.g. 
abolishing the coffee shops—were undesirable and potentially harmful to public health. The 
report concluded that combating organized crime and reducing cannabis-related nuisance 
are best achieved by regulating the supply side (CAM, 2008). The Van de Donk Committee, 
basing its conclusions on the Trimbos Institute report, concluded that the main aim of Dutch 
drug policy—reducing the harms to the health of drug users—had been successful, as coffee 
shops facilitated the separation of hard and soft drug markets. It further noted that the cof-
fee shops did not contribute to high levels of problematic cannabis use, compared to other 
European countries, and that the tolerance criteria enabled effective control of nuisances 
(Van de Donk, 2009). 
6.4.1 Coffee Shop Tourism
But the Van de Donk Committee also recommended some changes. It expressed concern 
about the large, professionally organized coffee shops in the southern border provinces and 
increased trafficking of drugs across the border, citing public order, safety and international 
criticism (Van de Donk, 2009). At that time several cities closed down their coffee shops, 
including Terneuzen, or planned to restrict access of foreigners to coffee shops (VOCM, 
2011). The committee called it “an urgent necessity” that coffee shops become small-scale 
establishments again, restricted to local residents and maintaining the separation of soft and 
hard drug markets (Van de Donk, 2009). Coffee shops should become closed venues, based 
on a residence criterion. Notably, the committee also mentioned that if this were to take the 
form of a club with fixed membership, regulating the production and supply of coffee shops 
would be worth exploring (Van de Donk, 2009). 
6.5 The Weed Pass
Seeking to establish coffee shops as “members only” institutions, in May 2012 the govern-
ment introduced the weed club pass on a pilot basis in the three southern provinces. Two new 
criteria were added to AHOJ-G: B and I: coffee shops need to be small and closed (Besloten) 
and include only local residents (Ingezetenen) (Aanwijzing Opiumwet, 2012). Several studies 
evaluated the first months of this experience. In line with an almost daily stream of news 
articles on the ineffectiveness of the weed pass, Maalsté and Hebben (2012) concluded that 
local residents had stopped frequenting the “controlled environment of the coffee shop, but 
instead find their way to the illegal market.” Nuisance related to illegal street sales increased, 
as did feelings of insecurity (SSC, 2012). Local consumers refused to register for their passes 
at coffee shops, fearing that their privacy would not be guaranteed (Maalsté and Hebben, 
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2012; Wouters and Korf, 2011; Nijkamp and Bieleman, 2012). As of this writing, opposi-
tion among local governments against the weed pass is growing rapidly. Mayors of the G4 
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) and many other municipalities have spo-
ken out against the resident criterion (Volkskrant, 2012). As Mayor Aleid Wolfsen of Utrecht 
said: “The weed pass is a medication for a disease we do not have” (Posthumus, 2012). 
Since the September 2012 elections, a new coalition has been formed of Social Demo-
crats (PvdA) and Liberals (VVD). The new government has abolished the weed pass but, as 
stated in the coalition agreement, seems to insist on restricting access to foreigners. The 
new agreement also specifies that implementation of the residence criterion will be done 
in consultation with the municipalities concerned and, if necessary, in stages. The imple-
mentation also depends on municipal coffee shop and security policies in order to allow “a 
tailor-made approach per municipality,” which essentially means that municipalities will 
have a lot of leeway in the new guidelines. Nonetheless, mayors, civil society groups and 
an increasing number of parliamentarians are urging the government to drop the idea of 
the weed pass altogether and also to start experiments with the controlled cultivation of 
cannabis. Meanwhile, the cities are again spearheading reform, as municipal plans to effec-
tively solve the “backdoor problem” seem to be sprouting. The city of Utrecht plans to start 
a scientific experiment with NGO “Weed Clubs,” in which adult consumers can grow their 
own cannabis collectively. Rotterdam also wants to start its own municipal marijuana farm.
6.6 Local Initiatives
Municipalities have important leeway in making local drug policy. While successive govern-
ments have emphasized the importance of local policies and initiatives, they did not always 
adhere to this “Thorbecke principle” of local autonomy. For the coffee shop checkpoint 
in Terneuzen, for example, concerns over international relations overruled local efforts to 
regulate nuisance from cross-border coffee shop clients. 
Another example of the tension between national and local policies is the proposed 
experiment in Utrecht to allow recreational users to form an association to grow cannabis 
collectively, with monitoring of nuisance and leakage to illicit markets (Reinking, 2011). 
Minister of Justice Ivo Opstelten forbade the experiment (NRC, 2011), even though, as one 
Utrecht alderman noted, “[T]here are no valid legal arguments to ban a medical-scientific 
experiment, nationally nor internationally” (Everhardt, interview). The present Ministry of 
Security and Justice is apparently willing to let municipalities experiment only with repres-
sive approaches. 
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6.7 Public Opinion
Finally, public and political support for liberal policies is still widespread. A 2008 poll 
showed that 75 percent of those municipalities with coffee shops think the national govern-
ment should regulate the wholesale supply to coffee shops (NRC, 2008). And according to 
a 2010 public opinion poll, 49 percent of the Dutch feel that cannabis should be legalized 
while 13 percent believe the current policy should be continued. Prohibition of cannabis 
is favored by only 26 percent of the population (Blickman, 2012). A poll on May 16 2012, 
showed that the “cannabis pass” has little support among the Dutch population; 61 percent 
said it did not agree that its introduction was a good idea and 60 percent favored stopping 
its introduction. Even among the coalition parties that supported the now defunct right-wing 
government—the Christian Democrats and the conservative liberal party, the People’s Party 
for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) of Prime Minister Mark Rutte and Justice Minister 
Opstelten—only potential voters for the Christian Democrats were really in favor. Among 
potential VVD voters—the party that became the biggest party after the elections—60 per-
cent did not agree with the pass and 59 percent said its introduction should be stopped. 
Eighty percent of the people expected that street dealing would increase (de Hond, 2012.
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7. The Role of Drug Treatment, 
 Social Care and Harm
 Reduction Programs
With all of the changes since 2000, the Dutch nonetheless did not fundamentally change 
the harm reduction approach in place since the mid-1970s. Harm reduction included a 
policy focus on getting homeless people who use drugs off the streets. Cities experimented 
with local laws, municipal ordinances, public transport bylaws and a wide range of other 
measures to ensure public safety. Investments were made in housing for people who used 
drugs. Some of the housing projects are substance-free facilities; in others hard drug use 
is allowed according to house rules (Schatz, Schiffer and Kools, 2010). Health and social 
services for people who use drugs in fact are a bedrock of Dutch drug policy. The 1970s 
were dominated by ideological debates, e.g. abstinence-based treatment versus health main-
tenance or harm reduction (Blok, 2011). Unfortunately, there was virtually no communica-
tion between abstinence-oriented programs, on the one hand, and social support and harm 
reduction programs, on the other. 
Methadone treatment was introduced in 1968 (Van den Brink, 2010). In 1977, Rot-
terdam started funding low-threshold methadone treatment that specifically targeted those 
in the street drug scene. In 1979, Amsterdam followed suit by introducing a methadone 
bus for Surinamese heroin users (Blok, 2008). In 1981, the Rotterdam Junkie Union (RJB) 
published a “black book” critique of methadone treatment programs in the city (Friedman 
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et al., 2007) and, after its demands were ignored, the RJB organized a guerrilla methadone 
maintenance program, which lasted almost a year (Blok, 2011). This signified a turning point 
in the discussion on drug treatment and methadone maintenance programs were rapidly 
expanded. In the 1980s, methadone maintenance became the first-line approach to heroin 
addiction in the Netherlands (Van de Wijngaart and Verbraeck, 1991).
As early as 1974, drug injection rooms were available in Amsterdam (Blok, 2008; 
Amsterdam City Archives, ND), to which the police turned a blind eye. The city of Amster-
dam tried to address the street scene by establishing drop-in centers, drug consumption 
rooms and overnight facilities in various out-of-the-way neighborhoods. However, after two 
of these facilities were burned down, the city started implementing low-threshold metha-
done programs on a wide scale (Blok, 2008; 2011). 
The early injection rooms in Amsterdam also provided their clients with sterile inject-
ing equipment (Blok, 2011). In response to a local epidemic of hepatitis B, the Rotterdam 
Junkie Union started distributing syringes on the streets in 1981. A few years later, even 
after the first studies on HIV among people who inject drugs were published in the US, 
traditional drug treatment providers remained reluctant to introduce needle exchange. A 
small Rotterdam outreach program run by activists and volunteers then started a modest 
needle exchange program in 1985. By the end of the 1980s, syringe exchange programs were 
offered in most Dutch cities, by a variety of organizations and approaches. In 2010, around 
107,000 syringes were distributed in Rotterdam and 153,600 in Amsterdam, a decrease 
from the approximately one million syringes that were distributed between 1990 and 1993 
in the capital (EMCDDA, 2012), representing the declining number of people who inject 
drugs (PWID) in the Netherlands.
7.1 Chasing and the HIV Epidemic
In 1984, the first HIV case linked to drug injection was identified. HIV prevalence among 
people who inject drugs in Amsterdam quickly rose to 30 percent in the next two years, 
declining to 26 percent in the second half of the 1990s. Among people who injected drugs in 
Rotterdam, 12 percent were found to be HIV-positive in 1986, but prevalence never increased 
further (Beuker et al., 1999). By then the majority of people using hard drugs in Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam were no longer injecting their heroin and cocaine and gradually users in 
the rest of the country followed suit. As a result, HIV never affected hard drug users in the 
Netherlands as it did in the rest of Europe. In 2008, only 4 percent of the Dutch HIV cases 
were found among people with a history of drug injecting and 0.3 percent of HIV incidence 
was due to injecting drugs (Van den Brink, 2010; IDU Reference Group, 2010). 
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By the late 1980s the Dutch heroin epidemic had stabilized. In subsequent years the 
coverage of methadone maintenance programs further increased. In the 1990s, approxi-
mately 70 percent of the heroin users in Rotterdam were in contact with one or more drug 
agencies yearly—about 35 percent on a daily basis through participation in methadone pro-
grams (Toet, 1990; Grund, 1993), similar to figures in Amsterdam. The low threshold of 
these programs (e.g. no urine controls or sanctions on the use of other drugs; availability 
of needle exchange in methadone programs) has, without a doubt, contributed to the large 
proportion of heroin users in drug treatment. 
The Continuity and Change policy of 1995, described above, noted the successes of 
the health-focused policies to that date—including low incidence of overdose and of hard 
drug use—but also ushered in a greater focus on public nuisance linked to both cannabis 
and heroin. In the years that followed, public health and public order were approached as 
closely connected problems, and reducing harms to society became a driver of policy. As 
Professor Wim van den Brink, director of the Amsterdam Institute for Addiction Research 
(AIAR), explained, since the 1990s, ideology has decreased quite a bit and the Dutch have 
increasingly become more pragmatic: “The battles over whether addiction is a social con-
struct or a disease … is something I actively promoted. It is also a transition from labeling 
people who use drugs as criminals to labeling them patients … If they are considered ill, they 
are not treated as criminals, which means they have a right to treatment and are entitled to 
compensation for that treatment.”
New services were developed—including consumption rooms, housing; employment 
and training as well as other activities. Methadone doses were increased and heroin assisted 
treatment (HAT) was introduced as an experiment in 1998 and approved as a regular addic-
tion treatment in 2006 for poorly functioning, therapy-resistant heroin-dependent persons, 
although under strict conditions (Blanken, 2010; Fischer et al., 2007). By 2000, the Neth-
erlands had the highest opiate substitution treatment (OST) coverage in the EU except for 
Spain (EMCDDA, 2002), as an estimated 44 percent of the Dutch heroin users were receiv-
ing substitution treatment. In Amsterdam 80 percent received methadone or other substitu-
tion drugs in programs and from general practitioners (van den Brink, 2010). 
Despite the changed political backdrop and growing calls for zero tolerance, the Dutch 
continued to build a comprehensive and increasingly integrated treatment and social sup-
port system targeting problematic drug users, the homeless and chronic psychiatric patients 
(Schatz, Schiffer and Kools, 2010). At present, there are around 150 specialist syringe 
exchange programs across the country (EMCDDA, 2012) and about 37 drug consumption 
rooms (Schatz and Nougier, 2012; EMCDDA, 2012); specialized health care can be accessed 
through these and other facilities. Most aging street drug users live in sheltered or supported 
housing and receive welfare, drug treatment and medical care in integrated service centers. 
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Most of them use their drugs in a drug consumption room, and the use of substances like 
crack or heroin is no longer publicly visible (Schatz, Schiffer and Kools, 2010). 
The Netherlands has a strong tradition of civil society involvement, and taking care of 
vulnerable populations was traditionally relegated to NGOs and public health bodies. As a 
result, calls for tougher policies were translated by civil society and public health authorities 
into an emphasis on getting drug users off the streets. This was achieved not primarily by 
policing, but by developing a system of drop-in, housing and outreach services. Nonethe-
less, the criminal justice system became an increasingly important stick. Over the years, in 
particular when the four largest cities joined hands with the national government after 2006 
(Rijk en vier grote steden, 2006), the Dutch approach to problem hard drug use was devel-
oped into an integrated mix of social-medical interventions and measured law enforcement 
responses, aimed at reducing harms to both the individual and the society (Schatz, Schiffer 
and Kools, 2010). The combined “carrot and stick” approach seems to have been effective 
in addressing the needs of an aging population of problem drug users, whose drug careers, 
perhaps extended by cocaine smoking, were already fading. 
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8. Drug Policy by the Numbers: 
 Outcomes and Costs
The impact of Dutch drug policy can be seen in the data on prevalence of use and of harms. 
Overall, cannabis use in the Netherlands is on par with the European average. With the 
exception of ecstasy, the prevalence of use of all other substances by the general population 
is lower than the European average and that in the United States (ECMDDA, 2012; NDM, 
2012), and even ecstasy use is near the European average. The prevalence of problematic use 
of crack cocaine and heroin in the Netherlands is respectively at and below the European 
average.
8.1 Cannabis
There are no studies to compare the situation before and after the revision of the Opium 
Act in 1976. Both the lifetime prevalence and recent use of cannabis in the Dutch popula-
tion between 15 and 64 years (25.7 percent; 7.0 percent) (NDM, 2012) have always been in 
line with the European average, though the 2011 figures are a bit higher than the European 
average8 (23.2 percent; 6.7 percent) (EMCDDA, 2012). For comparison, the analogous two 
8.  Which is attributed to variations in measurement.
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figures from recent data in Canada were 39.4 percent and 9.1 percent and in the U.S., 
41.9 percent and 11.5 percent, well above the Dutch figures (EMCDDA, 2011a; NIDA, 2012; 
Health Canada, 2011). In comparing the cannabis markets in Amsterdam and San Francisco, 
Reinarman and colleagues found that neither criminalization (in San Francisco) reduced 
cannabis use, nor that decriminalization (in Amsterdam) increased cannabis use (Reinar-
man et al., 2004). Cannabis use in the Netherlands increased between 1997 and 2001, but 
returned to the 1997 level between 2001 and 2005 (NDM, 2012). 
Use of illicit drugs in general among high school students—cannabis no exception—
has steadily declined since 1996 (Verdurmen et al., 2012). Recent use of cannabis among 
young adults (15 to 34 years) in the Netherlands falls within the mid-range in the EU con-
text and is stable (Figure 1; Van Laar, 2009). The variety in cannabis prevalence among 
EU member states further supports the conclusion that drug policy has little effect on the 
prevalence of drug use.
FIGURE 1: Trends in Last 12 Month Cannabis Use among Young Adults, 15–34, in EU Member 
States and Norway
Source: EMCDDA statistical bulletin 2012 (http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats12#display:/stats12/
gpsfig4a)
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The number of treatment admissions with a primary cannabis diagnosis, indicating 
possible problematic use, tripled between 1995 and 2009 (IVZ, 2011). This increase has 
been attributed to the increasing potency of Nederwiet, but may also be due to the expansion 
of addiction treatment and care services, targeting cannabis users for treatment, changes 
in referral policies and changes in the drug choice of problem users (Van Laar, 2009). The 
increase in treatment for problem cannabis use was also observed in the rest of Europe 
(EMCDDA, 2011a). 
FIGURE 2: ARREST RATES FOR CANNABIS POSSESSION PER 100,000 POPULATION, CA. 
2005
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Source: The Beckley Foundation (2008), “Cannabis Policy: Moving Beyond Stalemate,” The Global 
Cannabis Commission Report (http://www.beckleyfoundation.org/Cannabis-Commission-Report.
pdf)
One of the principal motivations for the 1976 revised Opium Act was to prevent the 
stigmatization and marginalization of cannabis users, of which a criminal record is often 
the start, as it may be a barrier to employment and educational opportunities. In comparison 
to other European nations, arrests and convictions for use of illegal substances and posses-
sion for personal use are very low in the Netherlands (EMCDDA, 2011a). Figure 2 (source: 
Room et al., 2008) shows that, beyond any doubt, this aspect of Dutch drug policy has been 
extremely successful. Arrests, and thus criminal records, for cannabis use or possession are 
extremely rare in the Netherlands. 
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8.2 Hard Drugs
Use of hard drugs is not popular among secondary school students (12-18 yrs). With 2.6 
percent, ecstasy is the “list 1” drug with the highest lifetime prevalence among students, 
followed by amphetamine (1.8 percent), cocaine (1.7 percent) and heroin (0.6 percent) (Ver-
durmen et al., 2012). Among adults, the lifetime prevalence (6.2 percent) and previous year 
prevalence (1.4 percent) of ecstasy use in the Netherlands (NDM, 2012) are both above Euro-
pean average (3.2 percent; 0.7 percent) (EMCDDA, 2012), but still lower than in the UK (8.3 
percent; 1.6 percent) or Australia (10.3 percent; 3 percent) (NDM, 2012). Among 15-35 year 
old patrons of clubs and large scale dance parties in 2008/9, recent (last year) use of ecstasy 
was 16 percent and 31 percent, respectively—much higher than in the general population 
(3 percent) (Van der Poel et al., 2010). But in the same year there were an estimated 600 
problem ecstasy users and only 154 actually engaged in treatment (Table 1).
TABLE 1: Number of problem users (estimated) and people in addiction treatment
Substance Problem 
Users10
People in 
Treatment
Substance Problem 
Users
People in 
Treatment
Tobacco 810.000 251 Amphetamine 6.000 1.504
Alcohol 477.000 36.203 GHB 1.200 524
Cannabis 70.000 10.971 Ecstasy 600 154
Powder cocaine 30.000 4.246 Gambling 40.000 2.673
Crack cocaine 15.400 5.190 Internet/
Gaming/Chat
20.000 182
Heroin 17.700 12.313 Other  983
Total 2.002.500 76.175
The influence of drug policy on the use of Ecstasy may be very limited. In the Nether-
lands, as elsewhere, the primary drivers of ecstasy use are the electronic dance music culture 
and nightlife (Nabben, Benschop and Korf, 2012; NDM, 2012; EMCDDA, 2008). Hard drug 
9.  The estimates of the number of problem users are based on a number of studies, some-
times based on extrapolations. The numbers of problem cocaine, amphetamine, ecstasy and GHB 
are deemed “very rough” estimates (Jellinek, 2012).
10. A combination of the DSM-IV diagnoses of dependence and misuse. For example, 82.400 
people were diagnosed with alcohol dependence in 2010 and 395.000 with alcohol misuse.
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use is higher among cannabis users than in the general population, as is the case virtually 
worldwide. Table 1 presents the estimated number of problem cases and people in addiction 
treatment of various kinds in 2010 and for ecstasy and amphetamine in 2009 (Ouwehand 
et al., 2011).9 When compared internationally, the rate of problem drug use is low in the 
Netherlands, 3.1 per 1000 inhabitants, compared to 9.8 in the UK and 8.5 in Italy and Spain 
(Van Laar, 2009). 
Figure 3 represents the heroin epidemic in Amsterdam between 1985 and 2008. 
A large number of heroin users from outside the Netherlands came to Amsterdam in the 
1980s and 1990s—and still do—making the situation in Amsterdam unique. By 1985, 
the heroin epidemic had largely peaked and entered into a stage of slow decline (Toet, 
1990; Grund, 1993; Van Brussel, 1995). Heroin use remains present in the Netherlands 
though with minimal incidence and low, slowly declining prevalence (Van Laar et al., 2012; 
NDM, 2011).
FIGURE 3:  Problem Opiate Users in Amsterdam, 1985–2008
 
 Born in the Netherlands
 Born in Suriname, Dutch Antilles, 
Morocco or Turkey
 Born elsewhere
 Total
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
2,000
4,000
6,000
10,000
8,000
Source: Municipal Health Service Amsterdam
The proportion of opiate users between 15 and 29 dropped from 39 percent in 1994 
to 6 percent in 2006 (Van Laar, 2009). As already noted, the population of opiate treatment 
patients is largely middle-aged, average age 45.5, compared to 34 in 1997 (Van Laar, 2009; 
Wisselink et al., 2012). There are an estimated 17,700 problem opiate users (Cruts et al., 
2010), down from 25,000–39,000 in 2002 (Wisselink, Kuijpers & Mol, 2012). About 10 
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percent of clients in services for opiate users are over 55 years of age. Treatment for heroin 
addiction increasingly has elements of geriatric care. 
8.2.1 Drug Related Harm
Drug injecting continues to decline in the Netherlands. In the last decade, the proportion of 
recent injectors has halved to a little over 7 percent of all opiate users (Wisselink et al., 2012), 
the lowest in all of Europe. For example, the proportion in France is 25 percent, the UK 40 
percent and Finland 83 percent (EMCDDA, 2009). In recent years, only 4-to-5 percent of 
HIV infections in the Netherlands are associated with injecting drug use (Van Laar, 2009; 
Van den Brink, 2010; IDU Reference Group, 2010). With Belgium, The Netherlands has the 
lowest HIV incidence in Europe (EMCDDA , 2011b). 
The Amsterdam cohort study among hard drug users documented a sharp decrease 
in new HIV and HCV infections between 1985 and 2005 (Lindenburg et al., 2006). Annual 
incidence of HCV dropped to 2 percent in 2005, compared to 28 percent in the 1980s (Van 
den Berg et al., 2007). HIV incidence dropped from 8.6 percent in the 1980s to 0 in 2006 
and 2007 (Van Laar, 2009).
Although mortality comparisons must be made cautiously because of differing 
national survey methods, the number of drug-related deaths is relatively low in countries 
such as Italy, France and the Netherlands (9.5 per one million inhabitants in 2006) and 
high in Norway, Denmark and Luxembourg (60 per 1 million) (EMCDDA, 2011b). The 
low number of overdoses among drug users in the Netherlands is the outcome of the low 
number of people who use hard drugs plus extensive harm reduction and drug treatment 
services (Van Laar, 2009). 
8.3 The Costs of Dutch Drug Policy
Dutch drug policy is definitely not a laissez faire approach. Over the years substantial funding 
went to the social-medical interventions and to law enforcement in particular. In 2003 the 
Netherlands spent an estimated €2,185 million Euros on drug policy in total, representing 
0.5 percent of the country’s GDP. About €540 million went to drug prevention, treatment 
and care services, €42 million for prevention, €278 million for treatment and €220 million 
for harm reduction. Still, a whopping €1,646 million went to law enforcement and incarcera-
tion for drug-related offences (Rigter, 2006).
About €160 million per year goes to the investigation and prosecution of soft drugs 
crime. At present, the Dutch tax authorities are earning some €400 million a year in cor-
porate taxes from the country’s 700 plus cannabis-selling coffee-shops, according to con-
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servative estimates by the TV program Reporter in 2008. Further decriminalization and 
regulation of cannabis production and supply would reduce the pressures on law enforce-
ment and lead to significant cost reductions—up to this €160 million, a Ministry of Finance 
working group recently calculated. Furthermore, these measures could generate up to about 
€260 million in tax revenues (Ministry of Finance Working Group, Security and Terrorism, 
2010). 

9. Conclusions
9.1 The Dutch Applied Tolerance and Informed Dialogue
The Dutch tradition does not shy from controversy. The country has a centuries-long history 
of taking pragmatic approaches to potentially contentious subjects like abortion, sex work, 
voluntary euthanasia or use of psychoactive substances. Tolerance and collaboration, despite 
differences in views or lifestyle, were crucial to the early prosperity of the Netherlands (Bikk, 
2007). Early on the state’s role was perceived as safeguarding freedom for all of its citizens: 
“The purpose of the state is freedom,” wrote Spinoza in 1670, advocating principal tolerance 
on all terrains. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Netherlands changed from a rather closed 
and segregated society, organized along ideological and religious lines, to a more secular and 
individualized social order. However, the need for pragmatism, tolerance and dialogue did 
not subside and these qualities remained at the core of Dutch political process. 
In spirit, the 1976 Revised Opium Act—effectively decriminalizing possession of can-
nabis and other illicit substances for personal use and allowing coffee shops to develop—is 
rooted in the country’s early experience with the regulation of opium and cocaine. The devel-
opment of drug policy in the Netherlands has also largely involved finding middle ground 
between opposing views and building political majorities around this complex social issue. 
There was no parliamentary majority for decriminalizing the supply side of the cannabis 
equation, in 1976 or transactions in drugs other than cannabis, and the Dutch government 
did not want to risk diplomatic or economic problems with neighboring countries and the 
international community (Van Agt, interview). During the parliamentary debate in 1976, 
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D’66 MP Sef Imkamp wanted to go further than the “compromise of Van Agt” because, as 
he put it: this policy “is like a lame horse. You have to get on the road with it, but it will not take 
you far.” The “lame” compromise eventually allowed consumers safe access to cannabis in 
establishments tolerated under certain criteria, without securing a regulated and controlled 
supply to these same tolerated outlets (the back door problem). Nonetheless, this “lame” 
policy also exemplified responsible use of sometimes underused tools of drug policy—leg-
islative change, reliance on expert committees (although advice is not always followed by 
government) and civil society, and practical autonomy for local authorities who understood 
the particular context of drug use in their locations. 
Whereas the Dutch did reach compromise and political majorities on a great number 
of other complex social issues, such as gay marriage and LGBT rights, prostitution, abor-
tion, and assisted euthanasia, no further progress was made on cannabis policy, despite 
numerous government and civil society initiatives. Dutch politicians dealt with the issue in 
a pragmatic fashion, illustrated by the words of former Minister of Health Els Borst: “There 
are policy files where the best approach is to muddle through. It is not a great solution, but 
I have learned to accept that, while sometimes you cannot defend it on paper, a bit of mud-
dling through is probably the best solution” (interview). 
A constant in the history of Dutch drug policy is that it follows practice—from a 
distance. It is reactive, in the sense that policy follows and reacts to social developments, 
without proactively taking the lead. Coffee shops are a case in point. They are certainly not 
a social experiment planned by the government, but the amended 1976 Opium Act opened 
up the room for local policy and entrepreneurial initiatives. 
Although an unanticipated consequence of law and policy change, coffee shops were 
deemed expedient because they served the goal of preventing heroin use. As the heroin 
scene faded in the 1980s and 1990s, however, the policy focus inevitably turned to negative 
aspects of coffee shops, and numerous measures were taken to reduce the number of coffee 
shops and restrict their room to operate. The key negative side effects of the policy remained 
unsolved, partly because of the lack of drug policy reform in neighboring countries. Over 
the years, the influence of criminal organizations in cannabis cultivation and the supply of 
coffee shops have not subsided, despite enormous investments in law enforcement. Early 
evaluations and numerous media reports suggest that the weed pass, introduced in 2012, 
may have reduced the flow of foreign customers to the coffee shops near the borders, but at 
the cost of increasing drug transactions in the streets and peripheral neighborhoods, while 
most domestic cannabis users remain reluctant to register at a coffee shop. 
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9.2 A Positive Balance
The positive outcomes of Dutch drug policies are substantial indeed. Despite the liberal 
access that coffee shops provide, the prevalence of cannabis use has remained on par with 
the European average. Cannabis use ceased to be a sign of deviance or part of a subculture 
in the Netherlands—long before anywhere else in Europe. Most importantly, no Dutch youth 
will be socially handicapped by a criminal record for the mere possession of consumer 
amounts of cannabis or other drugs. As summarized in section 6, the remarkable successes 
in the area of hard drugs include averting a drug-linked HIV epidemic, the virtual disappear-
ance of drug injection, and comprehensive health and social services for the aging problem 
drug users. Moreover, unlike many other countries in the EU, where overall about 21 percent 
of inmates have initiated drug injecting in prison (EMCDDA, 2002), Dutch prisons are not 
transmission hubs for HIV infection.
The successes of Dutch drug policy can perhaps best be explained as an interaction 
between drug policy—including both health services and law enforcement—and a multitude 
of other factors. External dynamics, like immigration and urban renewal policies, heavily 
influenced the outcomes of policy and subsequent changes in drug markets. In addition, 
some successful outcomes were the result of simple luck. For example, Dutch heroin users 
were abandoning injecting even before the arrival of HIV, while an extensive system of low-
threshold treatment and harm reduction services was already in place. HIV prevention was 
then inserted into the existing services comparatively seamlessly. 
9.3 The Dialectics of Progress 
At the end of the 1990s and in the 21st century, Dutch drug policy has clearly been affected 
by what Dutch historian and journalist Jan Romein (1937) termed the “law of the handicap 
of a head start.” The initial head start in progressive drug policies became a burden in the 
long term. Dutch policies have clearly paid off—the hard drug problem has been largely 
contained, and cannabis use remained within acceptable limits, while cannabis consumers 
don’t risk acquiring criminal records. Successive Dutch governments had hoped that these 
demonstrated successes would convince at least neighboring states to implement similar 
policies. When it comes to hard drug policies, this has in fact happened. HIV prevention 
measures, substitution treatment and needle exchange are standard practice in most EU 
member states. 
However, as the Dutch were relatively successful in dealing with their own drug prob-
lems, they became more vulnerable to those of their neighbors. Without much international 
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support, the Netherlands struggled with drug tourism from neighboring countries with less 
liberal policies. At the same time, the Dutch government felt unable to regulate the back 
door because of alleged potential diplomatic and economic consequences. New generations 
of politicians seem to have forgotten why many harm reduction measures were taken in the 
past, and nuisance is nowadays measured by a different, stricter standard. 
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10. Lessons Learned
10.1 Decriminalization of Individual Possession 
   Does Not Increase Drug Use 
Cannabis use in the Netherlands peaked around 1996, after which it declined. The emer-
gence of coffee shops in the 1980s may have resulted in initial increases in use, but these 
cannot be disentangled from strong social forces, such as the economic crisis and high 
unemployment rates, music and youth culture, and globalization, to name but a few factors 
cited by our respondents. The Dutch experience has thus not been a slippery slope towards 
ever increasing drug problems. To the contrary, the Dutch policy of tolerance is not, as inter-
national critics have sometimes suggested, “one of closed eyes or of turning a blind eye, but 
one of keeping your eyes open, wide open” (Van der Ham, 2011).
The Dutch policy of tolerance is not, as international critics have sometimes sug-
gested, one” of turning a blind eye, but one of keeping your eyes open, wide open.”
One could argue that Dutch policy did not result in decreases in cannabis use. How-
ever, this was not the overall aim of the policy, which since the early 1970s has been to 
protect the health and social wellbeing of both the individual and the public. Moreover, the 
Dutch hard drug epidemic has been brought under control. Most respondents see this as a 
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direct consequence of the separation of drug markets, legally sanctioned in 1976, and the 
public health-driven drug policies developed in the 1970s and 1980s. 
10.2 Separating Drug Markets Is Legally and 
   Practically Possible—and Successful
The relatively low level of problem drug use in the country sets the Netherlands apart from 
other EU countries. Separating cannabis from the then-available hard drugs, as the Dutch 
pragmatically did in the 1970s, turned out to be an important step in controlling the concur-
rent epidemic of hard drug use. This suggests that firmly separating drugs with “unaccept-
able risks” from those with less worrisome risk profiles is good for public health. 
10.3 Separated Drug Markets Result in Fewer 
   Criminal Records, Less Social Exclusion and 
   More Controlled Consumption
Arrests or criminal records for the possession of small amounts of cannabis are virtually 
absent in the Netherlands; although the tolerated amounts differ, the same applies to hard 
drugs. Nonetheless, many Dutch problem (hard) drug users do have criminal records and 
have spent time in prison for other—mostly minor—infractions. As in the rest of Europe, 
many problem drug users come from disadvantaged communities, as do quite a few of the 
consumption-level heroin and cocaine dealers. These backgrounds are reflected in the prison 
population. However, as Mario Lap (interview) pointed out, the absence of criminalization 
has prevented drugs from becoming instrumental in over policing minority communities, 
as has happened in France, for example. Nor are there “no go” zones in the Netherlands, 
neighborhoods, typically dominated by drug markets, into which the police cannot venture. 
Dutch drug policy does not condone the use of mind altering substances, but these 
substances are no longer automatically associated with deviance in the Netherlands. Can-
nabis in particular, but also drugs like mushrooms and ecstasy, have been acculturated and 
to a large degree normalized, as are—to a large extent—the problems associated with heavy 
drug use. Drugs like crack cocaine and heroin, however, continue to hold strong stigma—
both among the public and medical providers—but they no longer raise moral panic. The 
1976 legislative changes and the resulting normalization brought the drug issue in plain 
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sight, allowing for a more realistic perspective on both recreational and problem drug use 
and exposing these to mainstream social controls. The Netherlands has the lowest level of 
problem drug use in the EU (Van Laar, 2009) and the overall prevalence of drug use in 
the general population is below the EU average and well below that in the United States 
(ECMDDA, 2012; NDM, 2012). 
A substantial proportion of Dutch citizens do use various substances other than alco-
hol, and for most this is limited to their formative years with differences between the sexes, 
social economic status and ethnic groups fading.11 As noted, The Netherlands has the lowest 
level of problem drug use in the EU; the large majority of drug consumers use drugs “recre-
ationally” without many complications and are not locked in into deviant subcultures. The 
virtual absence of injecting drug use, blood borne diseases and the low number of overdoses 
among problem drug users finally suggests that even hard drug users seem to be exercising 
a fair degree of control over their drug consumption (Grund, 1993).
10.4 Keep Expectations Low Regarding the 
   (Immediate) Effects of Drug Policy on Use
The primary objective of Dutch drug policy never was to ban drug use outright, but to con-
tain associated social and medical problems. Given the lifespan of epidemics of addictive 
drug use and the role of youth culture and nightlife in recreational—mostly unproblem-
atic—drug use, the immediate effects of drug policy on prevalence are a feeble measure of 
the success of drug policy. “Prevalence [of use] is almost policy-resistant,” as former drug 
policy maker Marcel de Kort put it eloquently.
“Prevalence [of use] is almost policy-resistant”-- Marcel de Kort
11. Which is likely due to normalization, emancipation, merging musical preferences and 
other factors.
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10.5 Public Health-driven Drug Policy Contributes to 
   Reduction of Drug-related Harm 
In contrast to the weak link between policy and drug use prevalence, the effects of drug 
policy on drug-related harms are more direct, immediate and, furthermore, more meaning-
ful outcomes for society. Problem hard drug users are rapidly aging in the Netherlands and 
drug-related mortality is relatively low. Refraining from injecting, most have avoided HIV. 
Leaving problem drug users at house addresses relatively undisturbed—in an effort to con-
tain nuisance—is central to explanations for the comparatively low number of HIV cases or 
overdose deaths in the country. 
10.6 Change Should Be Comprehensive, Regulating 
   Sale to Consumers, Wholesale Supply and 
   Cultivation 
Virtually all respondents in our study agree that the failure to regulate the supply to coffee 
shops and cannabis cultivation is the source of many of the current negative side effects of 
the Dutch cannabis policy—from the involvement of criminal enterprise to the lack of qual-
ity control. If there is one lesson to take away from the Dutch experience, it is that when 
taking steps toward regulating cannabis (or other drugs), these should include the entire 
chain of supply, from production to consumption. This prevents engagement with criminal 
elements and allows for quality control, increased tax income and decreased public spend-
ing. Policies should also be reflective of local or regional differences in a country, such as 
those between large cities and smaller communities. For example, although both Amster-
dam and Maastricht deal with drug tourism, their needs and problems are very different. 
Likewise, coffee shops are not the only model for controlled cannabis distribution, as sug-
gested by the Utrecht proposal for a closed-system growing club, Spanish “cannabis social 
clubs,” medical outlets in California, and legalized recreational marijuana use in Colorado 
and Washington in the US. Note that these alternative distribution models were developed 
at the local or regional (state) level. 
Therefore, public health-driven policy in the Netherlands also importantly includes 
cooperation between different levels of government and a large degree of autonomy for civil 
society, local health and other officials to respond to situations that they understand best.
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10.7 The Human Factor in Policy-making
Finally, as in Csete’s study of Czech drug policy (2012), we have noted an important human 
factor in Dutch drug policy making. Several respondents pointed out that it is not only the 
party affiliation of politicians and ministers that influences their position on drug policy, but 
just as much their personal interest in this policy file that determines the priority given to 
furthering drug policy. Perhaps more importantly, into the late 1990s, the seat of national 
drug policy making was located in the interdepartmental steering group on alcohol and 
drugs (ISAD), which was chaired by a senior policy officer of the Ministry of Health. Within 
the Ministry of Health, the key policy makers included medical doctors, a sociologist and 
a historian—dedicated people who had healthy doubts about the repression of drug users 
or prohibition in general. Of special importance has been Eddy Engelsman, who was—as 
the face of Dutch drug policy until 1992, when he left the MoH drug department—a steady 
force for rational, pragmatic and balanced policy making in which health is the goal and law 
enforcement but one of the instruments to achieve it. 
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Annex: List of Respondents
Academic experts
 Wim van den Brink. Professor of Psychiatry and Addiction Care at the Academic 
Medical Center of the University of Amsterdam (AMC–UvA). Co-founder and director 
of the Amsterdam Institute for Addiction Research (AIAR). 
 Martin Jelsma. Fellow at TNI (Transnational Institute), Drugs and Democracy Pro-
gramme Coordinator. Political scientist specialized in Latin America and international 
drugs policy.
 Dirk Korf. Director of Bonger Institute for Criminology for the University of Amster-
dam (UvA), Professor in Criminology. 
 Nicole Maalsté. Senior Researcher at Law School of Tilburg School of Politics and 
Public Administration. Investigative journalist and owner at Acces Interdit.
 Egbert Tellegen. Professor in Sociology and Environmental Studies at the Universiteit 
Utrecht. Author of “The Utopia of the War on Drugs” (Het utopisme van de drugs-
bestrijding).
(Former) Government officials and politicians 
 Dries van Agt. Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands (1977–1982), Former Min-
ister of Justice (1971–1977).
  7 1
 Dr. Els Borst-Eilers. Former Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport (1994–2002). 
Former Deputy Prime Minister, former Director of Academic Hospital in Utrecht, 
former Professor in Evaluation of Clinical Practice. Vice Chair of the Dutch Health 
Council.
 Lea Bouwmeester. Member of Parliament for Dutch Labour Party, PvdA (Partij van de 
Arbeid).
 Hedy D’Ancona. Former Secretary of State for Social Affairs. Former Minister of Wel-
fare, Health and Culture (1989–1994). Spokesperson on drugs as member of the 
European Parliament. 
 André Elissen. Member of Parliament for Party for Freedom. Former detective for 
Central Criminal Investigation Department, specialization in drugs.
 Victor Everhardt. Alderman for the Municipality of Utrecht (D’66–Democrats 66). 
Former senior researcher at Trimbos institute, former officer at Ministry of Health, 
Welfare and Sport. 
 Boris van der Ham. Member of Parliament for Democrats 66 (D’66).
Policy makers
 Eddy Engelsman. Former senior Policy Officer at Ministry of Welfare, Health and 
Culture. Former director of ‘Alcohol, Drugs and Tobacco,’ former representative of 
Ministry of Health for the European Union in Brussels.
 Marcel de Kort. Senior Policy Officer for International Affairs at the Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Sport. Member of EMCDDA Management Board. Former coor-
dinator research and monitoring at the drugs department and programme commis-
sion ‘Addiction.’ Also former deputy head of ‘Alcohol, Tobacco and Drugs.’
Civil society representatives
 André Beckers. Attorney at law. Exclusively focuses on cannabis. Former policeman 
in the eighties.
 Jeroen Bos. Partner of coffee shop ‘t Grasje  in Utrecht. Involved with PCN (Platform 
Cannabis Enterprises) in the Netherlands.
 Jaap Jamin. Team manager Addiction Prevention and Senior Health Education officer 
at Jellinek Prevention, Amsterdam. 
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 Mario Lap. President of the board of Drugtext Foundation. Technical commissioner 
INPUD (International Network of People who Use Drugs). 
 Frederik Polak. Independent Psychiatrist. Board member of Dutch Drug Policy Foun-
dation, president of ENCOD (The European Coalition for Just and Effective Drug Poli-
cies), board member of VOC (Association for the Abolition of Cannabis Prohibition), 
board member of MDHG (Interest Group for Drug Users).
Law enforcement officials
 Joop van Riessen. Former Chief Superintendent of Police. Former advisor for the COT 
Institute for Safety and Crisismanagement. Head of ‘Joop van Riessen, Communica-
tion & Advice.’
 Hans van Duijn. Speaker and member of Advisory Board of LEAP (Law Enforcement 
Against Prohibition). Former chairman of the Dutch National Police Union. 
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Global Drug Policy Program
Launched in 2008, the Global Drug Policy Program aims to shift the paradigm away from 
today’s punitive approach to international drug policy, to one which is rooted in public health 
and human rights. The program strives to broaden, diversify, and consolidate the network 
of like-minded organizations that are actively challenging the current state of international 
drug policy. The program’s two main activities consist of grant-giving and, to a lesser extent, 
direct advocacy work.
At present, global drug policy is characterized by heavy-handed law enforcement strategies 
which not only fail to attain their targets of reducing drug use, production, and trafficking, 
but also result in a documented escalation of drug-related violence, public health crises, and 
human rights abuses.
Open Society Foundations
Active in more than 100 countries, the Open Society Foundations work to build vibrant and 
tolerant democracies whose governments are accountable to their citizens. Working with local 
communities, the Open Society Foundations support justice and human rights, freedom of 
expression, and access to public health and education.

Drug policies that are based on human rights and promote 
public health are a priority for the Open Society Foundations. 
Our efforts focus on promoting collaboration and expanding 
the range of stakeholders committed to drug policy reform, 
empowering drug users to advocate for their rights at the 
national and international level and supporting research into the 
economic and social costs of current drug policies. 
Coffee Shops and Compromise: Separated Illicit Drug Markets in 
the Netherlands is the fourth in a series of publications by the 
Open Society Foundations’ Global Drug Policy Program that that 
documents positive examples of drug policy reform around the 
world. We hope these case studies will inspire policymakers and 
advocates in consultation with people who use drugs and others 
affected by drug policy to design rights-centered policies that are 
scientifically sound and humane.
The drug policy of the Netherlands—famous for coffee shops 
where cannabis can be purchased and consumed—exemplifies 
good decision-making in many ways and has had many successful 
outcomes. These include low prevalence of HIV among people 
who use drugs, negligible incidence of heroin use, lower cannabis 
use among young people than in many stricter countries, and a 
citizenry that has generally been spared the burden of criminal 
records for low-level, non-violent drug offenses. Coffee Shops and 
Compromise explains how these results have been accomplished.
In addition to drug policy reform, the Open Society Foundations 
work around the world to advance health, rights and equality, 
education and youth, governance and accountability, and media 
and arts. We seek to build vibrant and tolerant democracies 
whose governments are accountable to their citizens.
